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tionl cases. In fact, the cases cited in Roe as sup-
port for this standard of a compelling govern-
mental interest involved equal protection and first
amendment claims.
75
74 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335
(1972).75 Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621,
627 (1969) (involving an equal protection challenge of
a statute requiring ownership or leasing of taxable real
property to vote in school district elections); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (a statute
requiring one year residency before a person is entitled
to welfare was held to violate the equal protection
clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)(a state unemployment compensation statute which
did not recognize the first amendment right of a Seventh
Although the time periods adopted by the Court
seem to be a reasonable resolution of a sensitive
issue, criticism is warranted because of the Court's
willingness to "weigh the wisdom" of abortion
legislation, which is a practice outside of its given
function, and to expand the concept of personal
privacy far beyond its previous bounds. When a
decision rests upon a paucity of legal authority,
confusion is bound to follow. The lack of a con-
stitutional foundation for the right of privacy
established in Roe undoubtedly will cause similar
confusion.
Day Adventist not to work on Saturdays was held
unconstitutional).
PORNOGRAPHY
Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973)
Paris Adult Theatre I, et. al. v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973)
United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973)
Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973)
United States v. 12 200 Ft. Reels of Super 8 mm Film, et. al., 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973)
In Miller v. California and its companion cases,'
the United States Supreme Court attempted once
again to define obscenity and prescribe the limits
of its regulation consistent with first amendment
freedom of speech. Unlike recent past decisions,
however, the Court did not merely further explain
its Roth v. United States definition of obscenity.3
Nor did it set out additional procedural safeguards
necessary in separating obscenity from protected
speech.4 The Court instead returned to the basic
1 Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); Paris
Adult Theatre I, et al. v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973);
United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973); Kaplan
v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973); United States v.
12,200 Ft. Reels ot Super 8mm Film, et al., 93 S. Ct.
2665 (1973).
2354 U.S. 476 (1957); see text at note 7 infra.3See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969);
Ginzberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Mishkin v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966); A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of A Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen.
of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147 (1959).
See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51(1965); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
Roth definition for a fresh start at solving the
"intractable obscenity problem" by directing the
focus of inquiry from the Court to state legislatures
and courts. In furtherance of that goal, the Court's
avowed purpose in Miller was to "set out concrete
guidelines to isolate 'hard core' pornograithy from
expression protected by the first amendment...
[in order] to provide positive guidance to the federal
and state courts alike .... " 5
This note will explore the extent to which filler
changed the legal conceptions of obscenity as those
conceptions were developed in Roth and its prog-
eny. It will also set out and evaluate the new
guidelines prescribed by the Court for defining and
regulating obscene materials.
In order to more fully comprehend the current
state of the law of obscenity as set forth in Miller,
et al., and its implications for the future, it is neces-
sary to examine the basic definition of obscenity as
established in Roth and embellished in the cases
that followed it up to Miller.
In Roth v. United States,6 the Court held that any
S 93 S. Ct. at 2617-18.6354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). Roth was a prosecution
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1950) for mailing obscene
publications. Its companion case, Alberts v. California,
was a state prosecution for the retail sale of obscene
publications. Id. at 479-80.
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materials which dealt with sex in a manner appeal-
ing to prurient interest were obscene and not pro-
tected speech within the first and fourteenth
amendments. The standard of obscenity was
whether to the average person applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant theme of
the materials taken as a whole appealed to prurient
interest. 7
The "average person" was indeed the average
person, and not the weakest nor the most insensi-
tive member of the society,s though the state could
use a less stringent standard in the proscription of
sales to minors.9 However, if the material was
designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly
defined deviant sexual group, the Roth test was met
if the dominant theme appealed to the prurient
interest of that group.'0
The contemporary community standards were
thought by a plurality of the Court to be those of a
national community which could vary from time to
time, but not from place to place." But before con-
sidering whether to the average person applying
contemporary community standards the materials
taken as a whole appealed to prurient interest, the
materials had to be patently offensive. That is, they
had to be deemed to affront current community
standards on their face.u In addition, it was not
7 Id. at 488-89.
gJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964). In
Jacobellis, the Court overturned the conviction of a
theater manager for exhibiting an allegedly obscene
film. It held that the movie was not obscene, which
determination it said it had to make as a matter of
constitutional fact. Id. at 187. It also held that the
standards to be applied in the Roth test were those of
the average, not the weakest person in the community,
and that the community was national. The material
had also to be utterly without redeeming social im-
portance. Id. at 191-95.
9 Ginzberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968).
In Ginzberg, a bookseller's conviction for selling non-
obscene (by adult standards) "girlie" magazines to a
16-year old boy was affirmed. The Court held that the
states could adjust the definition of obscenity as applied
to minors.
10 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966).
The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction for
publishing obscene books depicting masochism, fetish-
ism and homosexuality. It held that the prurient appeal
requirement could be adjusted to social realities "by
permitting the appeal of this type of material to be
assessed in terms of the sexual interests of its intended
and probable recipient group." Id.
"1 Justices Brennan and Goldberg in their opinion
in Jacobellis so stated their conception of contemporary
community standards, but there was never a majority
position on this though it gained some legitimacy in
the "Redrup per curiam era." The Court in Miller
expressly rejected that interpretation and adopted a
local community standards test. 93 S. Ct. at 2620.
12 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,
482 (1962). Accepting the finding of the Judicial Officer
sufficient that the materials were patently offen-
sive and appealed to everyone's prurient interest,
but they had also to be utterly without redeeming
social importance. 3 These last two elements had
to be determined before one went to the prurient
appeal test, and if the work was not without social
value, it could not be proscribed no matter how
patent its offensiveness or prurient its appeal. 4
Pandering satisfied the Roth test on the ob-
scenity vel non of materials in cases where they
might or might not be utterly without redeeming
social importance depending upon how and to
whom they were sold.'5 Finally, the mere private
possession of obscene matter could not constitu-
tionally be made a crime,18 even though this might
interfere with proof of intent to sell.
17
What all of the above seemed to mean was that
unless the materials in question were obscene in the
constitutional sense-that is, utterly without re-
of the Post Office Department, and the appellate court,
that the materials sent through the mails by appellant
were appealing to the prurient interest of their intended
audience, the Court held that the materials could not
be deemed so offensive on their face as to affront current
community standards and hence it was not required
to consider the issue of prurient appeal.13Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191-95 (1964).
See also A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Massachu-
setts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966). In Memoirs, the Court
reversed the finding of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts that "Fanny Hill" was obscene. It held
that a book was not obscene unless it was utterly
without redeeming social value, and that the social
value could not be weighed against nor canceled by its
prurient appeal or patent offensiveness.
14 383 U.S. at 419.
21 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475-76(1966). The Court, in affirming appellant's conviction
for selling obscene publications, even though the publi-
cations themselves were not necessarily obscene, held:
Where an exploitation of interests in titillation by
pornography is shown with respect to material
lending itself to such exploitation through perva-
sive treatment or description of sexual matters,
such evidence may support the determination that
the material is obscene even though in other con-
texts the material would escape such condemna-
tion.
Id.
16 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
Under authority of a warrant to search appellant's
home for gambling devices, police found and viewed
films which they determined to be obscene, and arrested
appellant for their possession. The Court held that
under the first and fourteenth amendments the mere
private possession of obscene material could not be
made a crime. The Court's rationale was that the
Constitution protects one's right to receive information
and ideas, regardless of their worth, and be free from
governmental intrusions into one's privacy and
thoughts. Id. at 564-66. In Paris Adult Theatre, the
Court limited Stanley to its facts. See text accom-
panying note 39 infra.
17 394 U.S. at 567-68.
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deeming social value, patently offensive on their
face, and appealing to the prurieft interest of the
average person applying contemporary community
standards--they could not be proscribed unless
there was evidence of sale to juveniles, an assault
on privacy or pandering?8 This state of the law
resulted in what one writer has called "a constitu-
tional disaster area." 19 Not only did the materials
themselves have to be judged for their social im-
portance, patent offensiveness and prurient appeal,
but the actions of the seller, the composition of his
advertising and the nature of his audience had to
be scrutinized as well. In addition, after Roth,
there was never a majority opinion of the Court
in an obscenity case.20 Hence, there was confusion
over such items as whether or not contemporary
community standards meant a national or local
community.n
The foregoing led the Court, prior to Miller, to
the Redrup v. New York approach to decision
making.P That approach consisted of the per
curiam reversals of convictions for dissemination
of materials that at least five Justices applying
their various tests deemed not obscene, and hence
fully protected under the first amendment. Thirty-
one cases were disposed of in this manner after
Redrup, with the resultant confusion as to what
standards the Court was applying in reaching its
decisions.23
18 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 768-71 (1967).
This case involved the criminal convictions of two
institutional sellers who sold magazines requested by
name to government agents, and a third seller who was
required to forfeit certain of his wares pursuant to an
in rem civil statute. The Court, in a per curiam opinion,
reversed all the decisions on the grounds that under
none of the prevailing obscenity tests were the mate-
rials obscene. It said that in none of the cases was there
a claim of specific state concern for juveniles, an assault
upon individual privacy, or evidence of pandering.
The materials themselves were not obscene, either as
"hard-core pornography" or via the Justice Brennan
three-part test of prurient appeal, patent offensiveness
and total lack of social value. Hence, the judgements
were reversed. The Court in Miller expressly repudiated
this approach, which was followed in 31 cases after
Redrup, and listed it as one of the primary reasons for
its attempt to "regroup" on the obscenity issue. 93 S.
Ct. at 2617.9 Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth.
Sup CT. REv. 7, 56-7 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Magrath].20 See 93 S. Ct. at 2614. For a general discussion of the
different views and alignments of the Justices, see
MAGRATH.21 See note 11 supra.
- 386 U.S. 767 (1967); see note 18 supra.
3 For a full exposition of this approach, see the
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Paris Adult
Theatre I, et al. v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. at 2628, 2646 (1973)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Miller, the Court expressly eschews this per
curiam approach as unworkable, and sets out to
resolve the problems it has engendered. As Chief
Justice Burger states in the Miller opinion:
It is certainly true that the absence, since Roth, of a
single majority view of this Court as to proper
standards for testing obscenity has placed a strain
on both state and federal courts. But today, for the
first time since Roth was decided in 1957, a majority
of this Court has agreed to concrete guidelines to
isolate "hard core" pornography from expression
protected by the First Amendment. Now we may
abandon the casual practice of Redrup v. New York,
supra, and attempt to provide positive guidance to
the federal and state courts alike.u
From 1957 to the present, then, the Court has
developed a tortured history of decisions trying to
balance the interests of free speech with those of
the "moral health and welfare" of the citizenry.
Both the majority and the minorities in Miller
admit failure and a desire to start fresh.25 Which
24 93 S. Ct. at 2617 (emphasis in original).
25 See text at note 24 supra for the majority's ex-
pression of dissatisfaction. For the minority, Justice
Brennan in Paris Adult Theatre states:
This case requires the Court to confront once again
the vexing problem of reconciling state efforts to
suppress sexually oriented expression with the
protections of the First Amendment, as applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
No other aspect of the First Amendment has, in
recent years, demanded so substantial a commit-
ment of our time, generated such disharmony of
views, and remained so resistant to the formula-
tion of stable and manageable standards. I am
convinced that the approach initiated 15 years ago
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and
culminating in the Court's decision today, cannot
bring stability to this area of the law withoutjeopardizing fundamental First Amendment
values, and I have concluded that the time has
come to make a significant departure from that
approach.
93 S. Ct. at 2642 (emphasis original).
Mr. Justice Douglas states the following:
I have expressed on numerous occasions my dis-
agreement with the basic decision that held that
"obscenity" was not protected by the First Amend-
ment. I disagreed also with the definitions that
evolved. Art and literature reflect tastes; and
tastes, like musical appreciation, are hardly reduci-
ble to precise definitions. That is one reason I have
always felt that "obscenity" was not an exception
to the First Amendment. For matters of taste, like
matters of belief, turn on the idiosyncracies of
individuals. They are too personal to define and too
emotional and vague to apply....
The other reason I could not bring myself to
conclude that "obscenity" was not covered by the
First Amendment was that prior to the adoption
of our Constitution and Bill of Rights the colonies
had no law excluding "obscenity" from the regime
1973]
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approach to that fresh start is more likely to be
successful is perhaps discernible by examining the
various opinions in the most recent decisions,
keeping in mind the course of obscenity decisions
to date.
Miller v. California
Miller v. California2 6 arose when the appellant
sent brochures advertising four "adult" books 2 to
a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. The
manager of the restaurant and his mother were the
recipients of the unrequested brochures. Appellant
was charged with and convicted of the misde-
meanor of knowingly distributing obscene matter.28
It was assumed at trial that the three-part
Memoirs v. Massachusetts29 test was applicable in
determining whether or not the objectionable
materials were obscene. The Memoirs test required
that in order for materials to be judged obscene,
it must be established that to the average person:
(a) the dominant theme of the materials, taken as a
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters; and
(c) the material is "utterly without redeeming
social value." 30
It was determined at trial and affirmed on appeal
that the materials appellant distributed were ob-
scene under the above standard of obscenity. The
only significant deviation made by the California
of freedom of expression and press that then ex-
isted.
I applaud the effort of my Brother Brennan to
forsake the low road which the Court has followed
in this field. The new regime he would inaugurate
is much closer than the old to the policy of absten-
tion which the First Amendment proclaims....
Id. at 2663-64.
2593 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
r The books are entitled: "MAN-Woxn", "SEx
ORGIES ILLUSTRATED", "INTERCOURSE," and "AN
ILLUSTRATED HirsTORY Or PORNOGRAPHY." There also
was a film advertised, entitled "MARITAL INTER-
coURSE." Their content was described by the Court in
the following manner:
While the brochures contain some descriptive
printed material, primarily they consist of pictures
and drawings very explicitly depicting men and
women in groups of two or more engaging in a
variety of sexual activities with genitals often
prominently displayed.
Id. at 2611-12.
2 In contravention of CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a)(West 1970).
"383 U.S. 413 (1966); see text at note 13 supra.
,0383 U.S. at 418.
courts from prior United States Supreme Court
case law was that of defining contemporary com-
munity standards as meaning California standards
and not national ones."' The Supreme Court
affirmed this view, stating:
Nothing in the first amendment requires that a jury
must consider hypothetical and unascertainable
"national standards" when attempting to deter-
mine whether certain materials are obscene as a
matter of fact....
[ihe primary concern with requiring a jury to
apply the standard of the "average person applying
contemporary community standards" is to be
certain that, so far as material is not aimed at a
deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on an
average person, rather than a particularly sus-
ceptible or sensitive person-or indeed a totally in-
sensitive one.... We hold the requirement that a
jury evaluate the materials with reference to "con-
temporary standards of the state of California"
serves this protective purpose and is constitution-
ally adequate.2
Since local versus national community standards
was not a settled issue prior to Miller, and the jury
had determined that the materials were in fact
obscene under Memoirs, and there was evidence
that the appellant had foisted his wares upon un-
willing recipients, the Court could easily have
affirmed the conviction under the Redrup approach,
either by affirming that the materials were obscene
in the constitutional sense, 2 or if they were not,
by holding that appellant's conduct in distributing
the materials made them so under Ginzburg and
Redrup.34 Instead, the Court chose to take the
opportunity to purge Memoirs from the Roth test,
in particular, the "utterly without social value"
prong of that test.
The Court began with the proposition that ob-
scene material is unprotected by the first amend-
31 See note 11 supra. Apparently, at trial both defense
and prosecution counsel assumed "contemporary
community standards" to mean California standards.
The trial court so instructed the jury, and though
appellant raised this issue on appeal, the trial court was
affirmed. 93 S. Ct. at 2619-20 & nn. 12-13.2 Id.
23 See text at note 18 supra.
"4See notes 15 & 18 supra. The Court described
appellant's conduct as follows:
This case involves the application of a State's
criminal obscenity statute to a situation in which
sexually explicit materials have been thrust by
aggressive sales action upon unwilling recipients
who in no way indicated any desire to. receive such
materials.
93 S. Ct. at 2612.
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ment, as held in Roth, and thus could be regulated
by government. It went on to say that because of
the nature of its subject matter, such regulation
must be carefully drawn, and laid down the follow-
ing test:
[W]e now confine the permissible scope of suchreg-
ulation. to works which depict or describe sexual
conduct... specifically defined by applicable state
law, as written or authoritatively construed. A
state offense must also be limited to works which,
taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest
in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently
offensive way, and which taken as a whole, do not
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
It would seem then that Miller stands for the
proposition that state legislatures can statutorily
define specific depictions or descriptions of sexual
conduct as obscene."8 The main question for the
reviewing court is, then, whether or not the
statute is sufficiently drawn to give adequate
notice.n The trier of fact then decides whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined in the
statute; whether the average person, applying
contemporary local community standards, would
find that the work taken as a whole appeals to
one's prurient interest in sex; and, finally, if the
work is so found obscene, whether it has sufficient
literary, artistic, political or scientific value to save
it from the fire.u
35 93 S. Ct. at 2614.35 Admitting that it was not the function of the
Court to propose legislation, and that the sufficiency
of legislation would have to await further decision,
the Court gave the following examples of specific con-
duct which could be proscribed:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descrip-
tions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted,
actual or simulated; [and]
(b) Patently offensive representations or descrip-
tions of masturbation, excretory functions, and
lewd exhibition of the genitals.
Id. at 2615.7 For the Court's idea of statutes so drawn, see
HAWArI PENAL CODE, Tit. 37, §§ 1210-16, Hawaii
Session Laws, pp. 126-29, Act 9, Pt. II (1972); OREGON
LAWS ch. 743, Art. 29, §§ 255-62 (1971).
3893 S. Ct. at 2614-17. The court described its
holding the following terms:
Under the holdings announced today, no one
will be sibject to prosecution for the sale or expo-
sure of obscene materials unless these materials
depict or describe patently offensive "hard core"
sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulat-
ing state law, as written or construed. We are
satisfied that these specific prerequisites will pro-
vide fair notice to a dealer in such materials that
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 9
In Paris Adult Theatre, the Court explained the
latitude of permissible state regulation authorized
by Miller. At the same time, it laid to rest any
lingering doubts that the privacy theory of Stanley
v. Georgia4° could be argued beyond the narrow
his public and commercial activities may bring
prosecution.
Id. at 2616.
In tackling the ongoing problem of understanding the
Court's definitions, it said:
In resolving the inevitably sensitive questions of
fact and law, we must continue to rely on the jury
system, accompanied by the safeguards thatjudges, rules of evidence, presumption of innocence
and other protective features provide, as we do
with rape, murder and a host of other offenses
against society and its individual members.Id.;9 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973). In this civil proceeding the
state of Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of two
motion pictures on the grounds that they were obscene
and shown in violation of GEORGIA CODE ANeN. § 26-
2101 (1953). The trial court, upon complaint, issued a
temporary injunction restraining the theater owners
from destroying or removing the films from the court'sjurisdiction. It also ordered respondents to bring the
films to court with them two weeks later. At bench
trial, the court found that a sign bearing the legend-
"Adult Theatre-You must be 21 and able to prove it.
If viewing the nude body offends you, Please Do Not
Enter"- was posted at the theater entrance; that
there was no conclusive evidence presented that minors
had ever entered the theater, nor that they had been
systematically excluded; that the marquees did not
display offensive pictures, nor did it give notice of the
full content of the films. The court held:
It appears to the Court that the display of these
films in a commercial theatre, when surrounded
by requisite notice to the public of their nature
and by reasonable protection against the exposure
of these films to minors, is constitutionally per-
missible.
Id. at 2632-33.
The Georgia supreme court, assuming that minors
were excluded and adequate notice of the film's content
was given, reversed on appeal, saying that "the sale
and delivery of obscene material to willing adults is not
protected under the first amendment." Id. The United
States Supreme Court agreed with this Georgia holding,
but vacated and remanded the case for consideration of
whether or not the Georgia statute met the new stan-
dards set out in Miller. Id. at 2633-34.
°394 U.S. 557 (1969); see note 16 supra. In two
prior cases, United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351(1971), and United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
402 U.S. 363 (1971), the fate of Stanley was perhaps
forecast. In Reidd, the Court refused to hold the federal
anti-obscenity mailing statute unconstitutionally
broad in that it did not distinguish between protected
and unprotected deliveries. That is, even though the
materials were being sent only to willing adults, the
delivery was not protected under Roth and Stanley.
In Thirly-Seven Photographs, likewise, the Court held
that obscene materials could be seized at a port of
entry to the United States, even though they were
being imported solely for private use.
1973]
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facts of that case. In essence, the Court held that
there was a permissible state interest in regulating
obscenity beyond the protection of juveniles and
unconsenting adults. And, although there was
conflicting evidence as to the connection between
obscene materials and sex crimes, the state legisla-
ture could resolve for themselves the empirical un-
certainties revolving around the effects of ob-
scenity. It held that the state interest in maintain-
ing a "decent society" was sufficient apart from
the questionable relation between obscenity and
crime. The Court said:
In particular, we hold that there are legitimate
state interests at stake in stemming the tide of com-
mercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible
to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to
juveniles and to the passerby. Rights and interests
"other than those of the advocates are involved."
Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
These include the interest of the public in the
quality of life and the total community environ-
ment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers
and, possibly, the public safety itself .... As Chief
Justice Warren stated, there is a "right of the Na-
tion and of the States to maintain a decent
society ... ," Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199
(1964) (Warren, C. J., dissenting) .... It is not for
us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying
state legislation, save in the exceptional case where
that legislation plainly impinges upon rights pro-
tected bythe Constitution itself. ... Although there
is no conclusive proof of a connection between anti-
social behavior and obscene material, the legisla-
ture of Georgia could quite reasonably determine
that such a connection does or might exist. In de-
ciding Roth, this Court implicity accepted that a
legislature could legitimately act on such a conclu-
sion to protect "the social interest in order and ,no-
rality." Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U.S., at 485
(1957), quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942).41
4193 S. Ct. at 2935-36 (emphasis added). In further
exposition of the state interests that its decisions sought
to protect, the Court quoted Professor Bickel as saying
that apart from sex crimes, there remained one other
problem of importance.
It concerns the tone of the society, the mode,
or to use terms that have perhaps greater cur-
rency, the style and quality of life, now and in the
future. A man may be entitled to read an obscene
book in his room, or expose himself indecently
there... We should protect his privacy. But if
he demands a right to obtain the books and pictures
he wants in the market, and to foregather in public
places-discreet, if you will, but accessible to all-
with others who share his tastes, then to grant him
his right is to affect the world about the rest of us,
and to impinge on other privacies. Even supposing
that each of us can, if he wishes, effectively avert
As for Stanley, the Court made it clear that the
right of one to possess obscene materials in the
privacy of one's home would not be extended into
a general right of privacy of consenting adults to
obtain such materials or gather together for the
purpose of viewing them:
Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment in-
cluded "only those personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325." [si] Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
This privacy right encompasses and protects the
personal intimacies of the home, the family, mar-
riage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing.
[citations omitted] Nothing, however, in this
Court's decisions intimates that there is any "fun-
damental" privacy right "implicit in the concept of
order liberty" to watch obscene movies in places
of public accommodation.4
It is upon these issues, especially, that Mr.
Justice Brennan parts ways with the majority and
offers his own theory of what new test should be
adopted in the wake of the admitted unworkability
of the Roth line of decisions. Basically, his theory
is that the Court, rather than delimiting Redrup
and Stanley, should seek to protect only the inter-
ests which those cases sought to protect. Those
interests are, the protection of children and un-
consenting adults, and a respect for the privacy
and freedom of those consenting adults who wish
to be able to obtain and use so-called obscene
materials-at least until it is shown that such use
endangers the public safety.
In questioning the validity of the state interest
in maintaining a "decent society" in this manner,
and the wisdom of allowing the states to resolve
empirical uncertainties in favor of more stringent
regulation, Justice Brennan states:
If, as the Court today assumes, "a state legisla-
ture may ... act on the ... assumption that...
commerce in obscene books, or public exhibitions
focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency to
exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to
antisocial behavior".., then it is hard to see how
state-ordered regimentation of bur minds can ever
be forestalled. For if a State may, in an effort to
maintain or create a particular moral tone, pre-
the eye and stop the ear (which, in truth, we can-
not), what is commonly read and seen and heard
and done intrudes upon us all, want it or not. 22
THE PUBLIc INsTERES 25, 25-26 (Winter, 1971).
Id. (emphasis by the Court).
1 Id. at 2639-40. See also note 40 supra.
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scribe what its citizens cannot read or cannot see,
then it would seem to follow that in pursuit of that
same objective a State could decree that its citizens
must read certain books or must view certain
films....
In short, while I cannot say that the interests of
the State-apart from the question of juveniles and
unconsenting adults-are trivial or nonexistent, I
am compelled to conclude that these interests can-
not justify the substantial damage to constitutional
rights and to this Nation's judicial machinery that
inevitably results from state efforts to bar the dis-
tribution even of unprotected material to con-
senting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments prohibit the state and federal governments
from attempting wholly to suppress sexually
oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly
"obscene" contents. Nothing in this approach pre-
cludes those governments from taking action to
serve what may be strong and legitimate interests
through regulation of the manner of distribution of
sexually oriented material."
While the majority is thus willing to weigh the
empirical uncertainties surrounding the "dele-
terious" effects of obscenity in favor of the state's
right to regulate, Justice Brennan w6uld strike the
balance in favor of the first amendment. Although
the majority says it does not have to consider the
first amendment, since obscenity is unprotected, it
assumes its conclusion since the only reason ob-
scenity is not protected is that it was thought to
be utterly without redeeming social value." Since
that standard is no longer the measure of what
4 Id. at 2661-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85(1957). As Justice Brennan stated in Paris Adult
Theatre:
[T]he definition of "obsceity" as expression
utterly lacking in social importance is the key to
the conceptual basis of Roth and our subsequent
opinions. In Roth we held that certain expression is
obscene and thus outside the protection of the
First Amendment, precisely because it lacks even
the slightest redeeming social value. [citations
omitted] The Court's approach [today] necessarily
assumes that some works will be deemed obscene-
even though they clearly have some social value-
because the State was able to prove that the value,
measured by some unspecified standard, was not
sufficiently "serious" to warrant constitutional
protection. That result is not merely inconsistent
with our holding in Roth; it is nothing less than a
rejection of the fundamental First Amendment
premises and rationale of the Roth opinion and an
invitation to widespread suppression of sexually
oriented speech. Before today, the protections of
the First Amendment have never been thought
limited to expressions of serious literary or political
value....
93 S. Ct. at 2654 (emphasis in original).
is obscene, and materials with some social value
may be banned, then the only reason left to pro-
scribe those materials is their harmful effect upon
society. If it cannot be shown that such a harm-
ful effect will result, then the legislatures have
been given license to ban books which simply are
not palatable to them. So, Mr. Justice Brennan's
solicitude for the impact of the Court's decision
upon the first amendment is well taken.45
United States v. Orito4
6
United States v. 12 200 Ft. Reels of Super 8
mm Film7
Orito and 12 200 Ft. Reels seriously limited the
right to private possession of obscenity established
in Stanley. In Orito, the Court held that the private
transportation of obscene materials was not pro-
tected under Stanley on the basis that: (1) obscene
material is not protected under the first amend-
ment; (2) the government has a legitimate interest
in protecting the public commercial environment
by preventing such materials from entering the
stream of commerce, even though the transporter
intends that the materials remain private; and (3)
4 As stated in Paris Adult Theatre:
Even a legitimate, sharply focused state concern
for the morality of the community cannot, in other
words, justify an assault on the protections of the
First Amendment. [citations omitted] Where the
state interest in regulation of morality is vague
and ill-defined, interference with the guarantees
of the First Amendment is even more difficult to
justify.
Id. at 2662.
493 S. Ct. 2674 (1973). In this case, Orito was charged
with transporting obscene material (83 reels of film-
including ten copies of some films) via common carrier
in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462(_). The trial court dismissed on the grounds that the
statute was overbroad since it did not distinguish
between public and private transportation, under the
authority of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479(1965), and Redrup and Stanley. The Supreme Court
reversed the privacy assumptions of the district court,
and vacated and remanded the case for consideration
of the sufficiency of the indictment under the Miller
standards.
Id. at 2675-76.
4793 S. Ct. 2665 (1973). In this case, the claimant had
movie films, color slides, photographs and other printed
and graphic materials seized pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1305(a) ( ) as he attempted to bring them through
customs in Los Angeles from Mexico. Claimant filed an
affidavit with the district court asserting that none of
the materials seized were for public display or distribu-
tion, but were intended solely for his personal use. The
district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds
that the statute was overbroad, including within its
sweep materials for private use. The Supreme Court
held that the district court erred in its determination
that the statute was unconstitutional, and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of Miller.
1973]
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no constitutional right of privacy protects such
materials beyond the home."
Likewise, in 12 200 Ft. Reels, the Court held that
Stanley did not permit one to purchase obscene
matter for use in the home, though that use was
protected, stating that Stanley "depended not on
any First Amendment right to purchase or possess
obscene materials, but on the right to privacy in
the home." 49 It should be noted that the Court
was basing its decision on the powers of Congress
under the Commerce Clause."5 However, the deci-
sion is still grounded in the theory expressed by the
Court in Paris Adult Theatre that government has
a legitimate interest in maintaining a "decent
society." 61 For without that interest, and without
any proven connection between obscenity and
crime, there would be no danger to any interests
for Congress to protect.
Kaplan v. California52
The final case in this latest round of obscenity
decisions was Kaplan v. California. Considering the
above four cases, nothing startling came out of
Kaplan, but a few loose ends were knotted. The
Court reaffirmed its Miller holding that local com-
munity standards were applicable under the new
test, as opposed to national ones." It also restated
the proposition that Paris Adult Theatre required
no expert testimony, and that the materials in
question themselves were sufficient for a deter-
4s 93 S. Ct. at 2678. The Court stated:
The essence of respondent's contentions is that
Stanley has firmly established the right to possess
obscene material in the privacy of the home and
that this creates a correlative right to receive it,
transport it or distribute it. We have rejected that
reasoning.
Id. at 2677.
' 93 S. Ct. 2688.
50 U.S. CoNsT. at. I, § 8.
5 See 93 S. Ct. at 2638-38. See also text at notes 39-
42 supra.
2 93 S. Ct. 2680 (1973). Petitioner, a proprietor of an
"adult" bookstore, was convicted of violating a Cali-
fornia obscenity statute, CAL. PENA, CoDE § 311.2
(West 19), by selling a plain-covered, unillustrated
book containing repetitively descriptive material of an
explicitly sexual nature to an undercover police officer.
No expert testimony that the book was "utterly with-
out redeeming social importance" was offered, nor was
any evidence of "national standards" offered. The
trial court, relying on the dissents in Jacobellis and
Memoirs, found that the case law was not settled on
those points, and that such evidence was not required.
It also held that the book was in fact obscene. The
Supreme Court affirmed both of those findings. The
case was vacated and remanded for determination as to
whether or not the California statute satisfied the new
standards set out in Miller.
"Id. at 26g8
mination of the obscenity vel non issue.' Finally,
the Court noted that unillustrated books could be
constitutionally banned as obscene as well as
illustrated books and movies. 55 It also reiterated
its decision in Paris Adult Theatre that:
A state could reasonably regard the "hard core"
conduct described in Suite 69 [the book] as capable
of encouraging or causing anti-social behavior, es-
pecially in its impact on young people. States need
not wait until behavioral experts or educators can
provide empirical data before enacting controls of
commerce in obscene materials unprotected by the
First Amendment or by a constitutional'right to
privacy.56
Beyond the question of whether or not these.
latest obscenity decisions will have a chilling
effect on first amendment interests, there is the
question of whether or not the Court has in fact
made the entire subject more manageable by
setting out "concrete guidelines" so that the state
legislatures and courts can effectively and con-
sistently administer the law of obscenity without
infringing upon protected speech. The majority
claims it has, and that, even though the Court
still remains the final arbiter of the Constitu-
tionality of the statutes and their application, it
can move away from the role of "supreme board
of censors" which it assumed under Roth and
Redrup.57
Mr. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, finds
the new guidelines are not only dangerous, but
will still require the Court to be a final board of
censors unless it is to abandon the constitution.
Furthermore, he sees the majority's decision in
Miller as one more step in the ongoing attempt of
the Court to separate obscenity from protected
speech, which it began in 1957, and which he feels
is an impossible task. It is time, he says, for the
Court to adopt a new approach to resolving the
problem, and he suggests one for its consideration."
Whatever can be said for the merits of these two
positions, it appears certain that the Court is not
out of the "obscenity business" yet. Undoubtedly
there will of necessity be further decisions explain-
ing what the limits of local community standards
5' Id.
55 Id. The Court noted that only once in the 15 years
since Roth had it declared any works obscene. That was
in Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), and the
book condemned was an illustrated one. See note 10
supra.
51 Id. at 2684 (emphasis in original).
67 93 S. Ct. 2617-18.
u See note 25 supra.
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